Why Cybersecurity Keeps Failing and How We Can Rebuild It
This index is one number from a larger argument: that cybersecurity’s failure is
structural, not technical. The foundations were wrong from the start, but we can rebuild.
Not yet published
Reported cybercrime losses have outgrown the stock market by more than six to one.
The Hacker in a Hoodie Index is the record behind that claim: what individual cyber incidents actually cost, each figure read from the document that reported it.
The index
What $100 became · 2014 → 2024
One hundred dollars, tracked two ways since 2014. The gap is the story.
Over 2014 to 2024, $100 tracking cybercrime losses reported to the FBI grew to $2,074, while $100 in the S&P 500 with dividends reinvested grew to $343: a difference of 6.05 times.
Hackers in hoodies2014
$100
S&P 500, dividends reinvested
$100
6.05×
Cybercrime loss outgrew the market over the decade: $2,074 against $343, both in nominal dollars, measured from year-end 2014 to year-end 2024.
Hacker in a Hoodie Index: reported losses to the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, $800,492,073 in 2014 against $16,600,000,000 in 2024. Compound annual growth rate 35.42 percent.
35.4%/yr10-year window · 2014–2024
34.2%/yrfull record · 2001–2025
The IC3 growth rate barely moves across windows. The index is not built on a chosen base year, and the 6.05x multiple compares like with like: both figures are measured from year-end 2014 to year-end 2024, both in nominal dollars.
THE INDEX · LIVE · 2014 = 100
The gap is still widening
6.05x was the first reading, taken through 2024. The index carries it forward. As of 2025 it stands at 6.48x, and it moves as the ecosystem does.
BOOK · 2014-2024
6.05x
the first reading
LIVE · 2014-2025
6.48x
where it stands now
Cybercrime loss (FBI IC3) and S&P 500 total return, each indexed to 100 at year-end 2014, both nominal. In 2025 reported loss rose 25.8% while the market rose 17.44%, so the gap widened from 6.05x to 6.48x. The book's 6.05x is the 2014-2024 reading and does not change; the index recomputes as each year posts.
Follow the record
New figures as they clear verification, and word when Built Wrong lands. No more email than the work warrants.
Index updates and Built Wrong launch news. No list sharing.
The Losses, Side By Side
What we’ve lost, by the numbers
Two documented measures of annual cybercrime loss, one log scale. The FBI IC3 series is a continuous
annual reading from 2014 to 2025, and by the FBI’s own account a significant underestimation.
These numbers are reported figures only. Chainalysis provides a yearly view of ransom payments.
IC3 reported losses / US complaints / Verified
Chainalysis ransom payments / on-chain / revised
About that trillion-dollar number: the $10.5 trillion often quoted for global cybercrime is a
forward projection from Cybersecurity Ventures, compounded from a 2015 base whose methodology is not
disclosed. Because it is assumed rather than measured, it is excluded from the chart and the ledger,
and noted only here. The trillion-dollar figure is constantly referred to in public messaging and
presentations, due to the propagation of those numbers in AI learning data. Cybersecurity Ventures
has never provided data that supports this forecast.
About 2010: the IC3 line skips 2010. The FBI’s own retrospective plots that year near $1.0B
while its contemporaneous 2010 report recorded $485M. The two cannot both be right, so we leave the
point out rather than choose.
The consequences that barely moved
Cost per breach barely moved.
Across more than a decade, while aggregate reported losses compounded at double digits, the modeled
cost of a single breach grew about 3% a year, from $3.5M in 2014 to a record
$4.99M in 2026.
If the per-event price is growing in the low single digits while the total keeps compounding at
double digits, the growth is in volume and attack surface, not in severity. That is a finding the
headline trillion-dollar number hides.
IBM’s figure is the cost of one breach, shown here for shape, not added to the totals above.
An intruder reached a legacy system OpenCode was already preparing to shut down, exposing the third-party API keys, OpenAI and Anthropic among them, that 1.4% of Console users had saved in their workspaces. The company ties it to a large-scale distillation attack but has not said how anyone got in, how long they stayed, or how many keys were exposed. By choosing to publish a low percentage figure as the "victim" count Open Code is obfuscating the fact that the number of victims is probably in the several thousands and that the exposed keys must be remediated by the same victims that trusted Open Code with their security.
Every loss here is Verified — the company’s own SEC filing states the figure, and the company name links to it. One incident, one figure, ranked by size, never rolled into a single total. Sort by any column.
The 10 largest of 28 Verified losses · each stated by the company’s own filing · one figure each, never added together · click a heading to sort
How each figure is gradedVVerifiedthe linked primary document states itAAttesteda published report credits a named sourceIInferredno direct confirmation; a lead, not a figureThe full standard →
On the Government Record · live
40SEC 8-K cyber-incident disclosures logged · 2026 year to date
All Verified · SEC 8-K cyber-incident filings, Item 1.05, Item 8.01, and Item 7.01
This counts the cyber incidents companies disclosed to the SEC on Form 8-K this year — the material-incident filings under Item 1.05, the cyber events reported under Item 8.01, and cyber disclosures made under Item 7.01 (Regulation FD). It is a count of disclosures, not a measure of total losses: most incidents never reach a public filing, and many are reported before any dollar figure exists. The ledger below also carries state-regulator breach and enforcement records, shown for context but not included in this count. It counts disclosed filings and never sums their figures.
An unauthorized actor sat inside Inner City Education Foundation's systems from August 4 to September 29, 2024, and may have copied files; the disclosure took two years to arrive. The filing never says how they got in, who they were, how many people are affected, or what data was taken. The assurance that no fraud has been seen comes from the organization that didn't see the intruder for eight weeks and didn't report the incident for 2 years. A bold claim for an organization that didn't see much of anything for 26 months.
Public Sector and Education
California AG breach notification
Initial attack typenot disclosed·Impact data theft inferred
From May 22 to September 18, someone with one compromised login copied files from ETS, the testing contractor holding California's student data; nobody has said how the credential was lost. The department counts names, addresses, demographics, and disability status for all 7 million students from three school years. One login stood between a single vendor server and a state's children. No Social Security numbers, officials stress, as if disability status could be reissued.
Public Sector and Education
California AG breach notification
Initial attack type compromised credentials confirmed·Impact data theft confirmed
John G. Yphantides, a Professional Law Corporation, lost data to a confirmed theft, and the October 2026 attorney general filing omits the entry point, the window, the record count, and the type of data taken. Qilin listed the firm on its leak site and claims to have stolen internal data. A law firm is a concentration point for other people's secrets, and the filing never says what guarded those secrets and failed.
Professional and Business Services
California AG breach notification
Initial attack typenot disclosed·Impact data theft confirmed+ ransomware·Actor Qilin
An intruder entered The Money Store's network on September 8, 2026, through a remote monitoring and management platform used by a third-party service provider; unusual activity surfaced a day later. Storm, the ransomware group claiming the attack, posted the lender's name to its leak site within two weeks, and the filing gives no count of those affected. Inside sat whole loan files: Social Security numbers, account details, income, and credit histories. A vendor tool built to reach every machine did exactly that, for whoever held the controls.
Financial Services
California AG breach notification
Initial attack type third-party or supply chain confirmed·Impact ransomware inferred+ data extortion·Actor Storm
Ransomware sat inside Foster City's systems from February 28 to March 25, 2026, taking names, birthdates, and health insurance numbers, and for a smaller group Social Security, passport, and medical records. Staff noticed on March 19, and the intruder kept access for six more days. The source never says how they got in, who they were, or how many people were hit. Containment meant unplugging the whole city at once, and only 911 sat outside the blast radius.
Public Sector and Education
California AG breach notification
Initial attack typenot disclosed·Impact ransomware confirmed+ data theft
Some losses surface outside any SEC filing: in a company’s own statement, a regulator or court record, or a news report crediting an identifiable source. Each is admitted on that attribution and graded by its strength. A figure credibly attributed to the company, a regulator, or a court is Attested; an estimate or reconstruction is Inferred. Each is logged on its own, with its source and grade, and like every figure here it stands alone, never combined into a total.
Napoleon Perdis lost names, birthdates, addresses, phone numbers, and purchase histories for roughly 339,055 customers through Retail Express, the vendor it paid to store them, where an unauthorized party had access from November 2025 to June 2026. Neither company has said how the intruder got in. Seven months of undetected access sat in a system the cosmetics brand did not run and could not watch. No card data was stored, the notice stresses. Only birthdates and home addresses, which no bank can reissue. The investigation into the incident was 40% faster than the time it took to discover the breach in the first place.
Retail and Consumer
Napoleon Perdis data breach affects 340,000 of the cosmetics company's clients
Initial attack type third-party or supply chain confirmed·Impact data theft confirmed
A cybersecurity incident at BAE Systems knocked out the Bankruptcy Noticing Center it runs for the Federal Judiciary, halting bankruptcy notices for every federal bankruptcy court nationwide. The judiciary has not said what happened, when it began, or whether any data was accessed or taken. Every bankruptcy court in the country shared one failure domain, and it belonged to a contractor.
Technology and Software
BAE Systems cyberattack disrupts US federal court operations
An outside party spent October 2 to October 7, 2026 inside BK Japan's app member system, reaching about 11.18 million records: names, email addresses, and mobile order history. How they got in, and who they were, the source does not say. Every member in the app sat behind one store of identity, a single failure domain the size of the entire loyalty program. No card data, the company stresses. Just a record of what each person ordered, tied to a name and an inbox.
Retail and Consumer
Burger King Japan data breach exposes 11 million customer records
Initial attack typenot disclosed·Impact data theft inferred
Attackers reached the Legal Aid Agency's IT systems in April 2025 and took applicant data: national ID numbers, criminal histories, debts, payments, and providers' LAA Online Portal credentials. Who they were, how they got in, and how many people are affected go unsaid. The October 2026 update puts roughly 250,000 records before 2007, the oldest from 1978. The blast radius was set by whoever decided a 1978 record still belonged on a reachable system, or any of the nearly 50 years of retained data after National Lampoon's Animal House premiered.
Professional and Business Services
Legal Aid Agency data breach: Compromised records date back to 1978
Initial attack typenot disclosed·Impact data theft confirmed
Phase Eight, Hobbs, and Whistles were hit together on October 11, when parent TFG London identified a cybersecurity incident in its IT systems. The source names no entry point, no actor, and no data accessed. Three brands running on one parent's infrastructure share one failure domain. Payment information, the company offers, is not believed to be at risk, which leaves every other record in those systems conspicuously unmentioned.
Retail and Consumer
Phase Eight, Hobbs and Whistles owner TFG London hit by cyber attack - just days after ASOS hack
FROM THE LEDGER · INCIDENT COUNT · n = 382 incidents
Which sectors the tracked incidents fall in: a count of incidents, not a total of dollars. Each bar is that sector’s share of the 382 on the record, ranked; a floor, not a census.
Share of incidents tracked on this ledger, not of all breaches. Healthcare leads partly because mandatory breach-disclosure rules in that sector put more of its incidents into the public record, not because it is necessarily attacked more often.
THE RULE
It would be tempting to add these numbers up and put one big total at the top of the page. We do not,
and we never will. Each line measures something different: different victims, different crimes,
different units, overlapping in some places and blind to each other in others. Add them together and
you get a number that means nothing, the kind of headline figure this index was built to refuse. So
the sources stay side by side, each labeled for what it counts, and the arithmetic stays honest.
THE FLOOR
The other temptation is to estimate what is missing and call the result the real number. We do not, and we never will. These are the losses someone measured. What no one measured has no number, only its absence. A figure that claims to cover the whole is not a larger version of this page. It is a projection, not a statistic.